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Comanagement programmes are gaining popularity among governments as one way of improving rural livelihoods. However,
evidence of their effects on the livelihoods and welfare remains unclear. We used the sustainable livelihoods framework and stated
preference techniques to assess the livelihoods and welfare impacts of forest comanagement on 213 households in Zomba and
Ntchisi districts. The results show that approximately 63% of respondents perceive that, overall, comanagement has had no impact
on their livelihoods.However, the programme is enhancing financial capital by introducing externally subsidised income generating
activities and human and social capital among some communitymembers through training programmes. Amajority of households
(80%) are willing to pay annual membership fees to participate in the programme (mean = 812 Malawi Kwacha), because of
perceived potential future benefits. Education, gender of the household head, a positive perception of current livelihoods benefits,
and a position on the committee increase household willingness to pay membership fees. However, the positive willingness to pay
despite the negative perception of overall livelihoods impacts may also demonstrate the weaknesses of relying on stated preference
surveys alone in estimating welfare effects.
1. Introduction
Forest comanagement approaches are promoted as oneway of
improving the livelihoods and welfare of rural communities
[1]. However, the evidence for their livelihoods and welfare
impacts has been found to be weak, due to limited rigorous
impact evaluation studies [2]. Nevertheless, the approaches
are gaining popularity and wider acceptance by governments
and donors in the developing world as a prerequisite for
conservation and development policies [3, 4]. The initia-
tives are also part of the larger economic and institutional
reforms being pursued by many governments under IMF
and World Bank lending conditionality since the 1990s [5].
Given this continued popularity, it is important to understand
how comanagement affects the livelihoods and welfare of
participating communities, to ensure effective and efficient
implementation and resource allocation [1]. Therefore, using
the case of a forest comanagement programme in government
forest reserves in Malawi, we assess the programme’s current
livelihoods impacts and estimate its perceived welfare bene-
fits among participating communities.
To assess the impact of comanagement programmes on
livelihoods and welfare, we adopted the sustainable liveli-
hoods framework, for example, [6–8], combined with a
contingent valuation question (stated preference technique)
to estimate household’s “willingness to pay” (WTP) to partic-
ipate in the programme, for example, [9]. The combination
of approaches was essential for obtaining a comprehensive
view of the livelihoods and welfare impacts, which would
otherwise be difficult to achieve if each method was used on
its own. For example, although stated preference techniques
are widely used in valuing natural resource and environ-
mental welfare benefits, due to their hypothetical nature
they are vulnerable to hypothetical and strategic biases and
do not provide explicit evidence for what a household has
actually gained [10–12]. Furthermore, household WTP may
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reflect either present welfare benefits accrued or expected
future benefits [13]. Therefore, by using both the livelihoods
framework and stated preference techniques, it is possible to
externally validate the benefit estimated by the contingent
valuation [14]. This combined approach is novel in the
forest comanagement literature. Therefore, this paper makes
a useful empirical and methodological contribution to the
existing literature on the livelihoods and welfare benefits
assessment and forest comanagement approaches.
2. Measuring Livelihoods and Welfare Impact
2.1. Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. Livelihoods have
been defined as “means, activities, capabilities, assets and
entitlements by which people build a living” [15–17]. Thus
they comprise both material and social resources [15].
Therefore, when assessing livelihood impacts of development
policies and projects, both economic and social aspects of
human wellbeing should be considered [16]. The sustainable
livelihoods framework developed by Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID) [17] emphasises the role that
development policies and programmes play in human social
and economic wellbeing; hence it offers a logical point of
reference for assessing forest comanagement programmes,
because they aim at improving both the social and economic
wellbeing of local communities [7].
The sustainable livelihoods framework highlights five
capitals upon which livelihoods impacts can be assessed.
These are natural, financial, physical, social/political, and
human capital (Table 1). The framework emphasises that, for
households to achieve positive livelihood outcomes, a range
of capital categories are required, because no single cate-
gory can sufficiently meet households’ multiple and varied
livelihoods needs [17]. Therefore, at a given time households
may draw on the different capital base to pursue a range
of livelihood strategies, so as to yield positive livelihoods
outcomes [16, 17, 28].
A household’s choice of livelihoods strategy is deter-
mined by the household’s preferences and priorities, as well
as trends (e.g., population and resources trends), shocks
(e.g., droughts), and seasonality (e.g., shift in prices and
employment opportunities), which are beyond their control
[18]. Additionally, availability of and access to the different
forms of capital are regulated by the existing transforming
structures and processes (i.e., institutions and policies) [17].
Therefore, household livelihood strategies and outcomes
are influenced by opportunities and capabilities to access
and acquire capital within the context and dynamics of
vulnerabilities, transforming structures, and processes [15].
Thus, although a comanagement programme is not a capital
in itself, it has the potential to provide opportunities and
capabilities for accessing the different forms of capital that
forest and forest systems provide and support [19]. By using
the opportunities, capabilities, and activities provided by the
programme, households can develop livelihoods strategies
that respond to their needs and constraints and eventually
translate into positive outcomes [20]. For example, compared
to state forest management, comanagement gives communi-
ties legal rights to access and use forests sustainably, hence
potentially providing them with new livelihoods opportuni-
ties and sources [7]. Additionally, access to and sustainable
use of forests can reduce the risks and vulnerabilities that local
communities face, since forests resources are an important
safety net in stress periods such as crop failure and drought
[21]. Studies on livelihoods, for example, [8, 19, 22, 23],
have identified and described various indicators for assess-
ing opportunities and capabilities that those comanagement
programmes can provide to communities in order to improve
their livelihood (Table 2).
We assessed impacts on natural capital based on local
people’s perceived changes in the availability, quantity, and
quality of forest resource stocks (i.e., timber trees, NTFPs,
and improved forest conditions) and changes in access to
forest resources. Impacts on financial capital were evaluated
in terms of perceived changes in income sources, income
levels, ability to access loans, employment opportunities, and
ability to accumulate savings. We assessed physical capital
at both community and household level (Table 2). At com-
munity level, we evaluated the differences in infrastructure
developments (e.g., roads) before and after the programme
was initiated, whilst at household level we identified the
various assets that households have acquired because of their
participation in the programme.
Currently there is no consensus on the indicators for
measuring social capital, due to its multidimensional nature
and ability to change with time and contexts [25]. Further-
more, DFID [17] suggest that measuring social capital may
be difficult for an outsider and may require a lengthy analysis
over time. Thus in an attempt to assess the impact of forest
comanagement on social capital, we evaluate the degree of
participation in communal activities (i.e., collective action
and cooperation) before and after the programme started.
Althoughhuman capital comprises education, knowledge
and skills, health, and food security, in this paper we present
impacts on human capital based on perceived changes in
training and knowledge development before and after the
implementation of the programme [19]. The health aspect of
human capital was excluded because direct impacts of forest
comanagement activities on health are likely to be limited and
difficult to quantify [8]. Furthermore, important elements of
human health such as vaccinations and provision of health
care are not part of the programme under study in Malawi
[26]. Additionally, because different forms of capital are
linked and can be converted into each other [17, 20], human
capital in terms of food and nutrition can be reflected in the
assessment of natural capital through changes in access to and
availability of forest products including fruits and vegetables
and financial capital through income effects. Therefore to
avoid duplication and double assessment, food and nutrition
were considered to be directly linked and reflected in the
natural capital benefits in terms of access and availability of
forest products.
Livelihoods are sustainable if they can cope with and
recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance
the current and future capital base, without undermining
the natural resource base [27]. As such households may use
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Table 1: Livelihoods capitals and their definitions.
Capitals Definition Reference
Natural (i) The natural resources and environmental services that form the basis for humansurvival and economic activities (e.g., forests, water, and pollution sinks) [17, 24]
Financial (i) Capital bases that enable a household to pursue particular livelihoods strategy(e.g., cash, credit, income, and savings) [17, 25]
Physical (i) Basic infrastructure (e.g., transport, communications), housing, and equipmentof production [17, 24]
Social/political
(i) Aspects of the society or community upon which households depend, when
pursuing livelihoods strategies that require coordinated actions (e.g., networks,
social relations, associations, norms, and trust)
[17, 25]
Human (i) Skills, knowledge, labour, good health, and physical capability that enable one topursue livelihoods strategies [17]
Table 2: Indicators of forest comanagement opportunities and capabilities for the different livelihood assets.
Livelihood capitals Indicators of comanagement opportunities and capabilities
Natural (i) Improved availability of and access to forest resources: (e.g., timber, firewood trees, and poles)
Financial and income
(i) Increased livelihoods and income sources
(ii) Increased income levels
(iii) Access to loans
(iv) Employment
(v) Ability to accumulate savings
Physical capital (i) Development projects (e.g., road building)(ii) Accumulation and acquisition of assets (e.g., land, house, household, and farm assets)
Social capital (i) Friendly relationships and social organization(ii) Degree of participation in local communal activities (i.e., collective action and cooperation)
Human capital (i) Training and knowledge development
different combinations of available capitals and activities in
order to reduce their vulnerability to stresses and shocks
[20, 24]. Thus, it is difficult to draw a conclusion on the
overall impact of the comanagement based on the changes
in the individual capitals alone [28]. Therefore, in addition
to perceived changes in the different livelihoods capital
indicators, local peoples’ perceptions of the overall impact of
the comanagement programme on their livelihoods were also
sought.
2.2. Stated Preference Techniques: The Contingent Valua-
tion Method. The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a
survey-based stated preference technique used to value goods
and services that are not traded on the market [29]. The
approach uses hypothetical scenarios with a defined payment
vehicle to elicit respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP), which
estimates the utility gained from the described service [9].
The underlying assumption is that although respondents
are presented with a hypothetical scenario, their behaviour
and responses reflect their behaviour in real situations [10].
We used the contingent valuation method, rather than
choice experiments, because the study was not interested
in exploring and valuing different attributes and levels of
comanagement but rather valuing the existing programme as
a whole [30].
Due to their hypothetical nature, stated preference sur-
veys are prone to biases including hypothetical bias, strategic
bias, and social desirability bias. Hypothetical biases arise
when the hypothetical situation presented to respondents
fails to reflect the real situation; as such the respondents
do not consider budget constraint, and hence the resultant
values usually overstate the real value [10]. We minimised
the occurrence of hypothetical biases by using a payment
vehicle common and familiar to our study communities and
also by prompting the respondents to consider their budget
constraint as they respond to the question [31]. Strategic
bias occurs when respondents respond to the question with
intent to influence the study outcome in their favour, if they
believe that the hypothetical scenario may become a reality
[11]. Social desirability bias, usually associated with face-
to-face interviews, occurs when respondents give responses
that they perceive as culturally acceptable or to be liked
by the interviewer, with a desire to appear to relate to the
socially desirable attributes of the programme [32]. To avoid
strategic and social desirability biases, participants in our
survey were made aware that the situation being presented
to them is hypothetical and developed for the purpose of
the study and was not directly connected to the programme
implementers. However, in order to ensure that consent was
informed, it was explained that the outcomes of the study
would be made available to the programme coordinators for
their reference. Other limitations of CVM surveys pertinent
to this study include the difficulty in validating the estimated
values externally and uncertainties associated with using the
method in developing countries because of the low income
and illiteracy of respondents [9]. However, despite the biases
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and limitations, CVM surveys remain a useful method for
estimating welfare impacts of environmental management
policies in both developed and developing countries if it is
properly designed [10–12].
3. Methods
3.1. Study Area. Zomba-Malosa and Ntchisi forest reserves
are two of the 12 forest reserves where the Malawi Gov-
ernment is implementing the Improved Forest Management
and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme (IFMSLP) through
the Department of Forestry [33]. The programme aims to
address forest degradation and poverty through promoting
community involvement in the management of government
owned forest reserves. The programme, which was in its 7th
year at the time of the study, was implemented for 14 years
from 2005 to 2014.
Zombadistrict is located in the southern region ofMalawi
and covers 2,580 square kilometres. Zomba-Malosa forest
reserve is the only gazetted forest in the district and covers
15,756 hectares, consisting of Miombo woodlands and pine
plantations. It is a catchment for major lakes and rivers in
the country (e.g., Lake Malawi) and a significant source of
water both for domestic and for agricultural use. The reserve
is also a source of wood energy (charcoal and firewood) to
households in the district as well as neighbouring districts.
This has accelerated deforestation and degradation of the
reserve. Additionally, the reserve is being encroached upon in
the peripheral areas for settlement and agriculture, resulting
in further deforestation.
Ntchisi district is located in the central region of Malawi
and covers 1,655 square kilometres. Ntchisi district has
3 gazetted forest reserves, namely, Ntchisi, Kaombe, and
Mndilasadzu forest reserves, withNtchisi forest reserve being
the largest covering 9,720 hectares. The reserve is located in
a remote and rural part of the district, approximately 32 km
from the district centre. The reserve is a source of nontimber
forest products including mushrooms and edible caterpillars
and water for communities living around the reserve. Tree
cutting in search of edible caterpillars is said to be a significant
cause of deforestation and degradation in the reserve.
3.2. Data Collection
3.2.1. Questionnaire Survey Design and Procedure. Prior to
the household survey, pretesting was done in order to assess
the acceptability of the payment vehicle and the response
rate to the open-ended CVM question. A total of 20 house-
holds participated in the pretesting survey, conducted with
communities living around the Dzalanyama forest reserve,
in Lilongwe. These communities were participating in a
community forest management programme, but not under
the IFMSLP. Before the start of each survey session, focus
group discussions with community members and key infor-
mant interviews with members of the committee, traders
and representatives of the community-based organizations,
were conducted in each study community to gather general
information about the programme and its impacts on liveli-
hoods. A systematic random approach was used in selecting
the households to participate in the survey interviews, from
a village register provided by the communities’ village heads.
The village list formed the sampling frame from which every
fourth household on the list was selected to form part of
the study. A total of 213 household heads in participating
study communities were interviewed (114 in Zomba-Malosa,
99 in Ntchisi), representing approximately 32% of the total
household population in the selected study communities.
3.2.2. Socioeconomic and Livelihoods Questionnaire. The
questionnaire first gathered the socioeconomic characteris-
tics of the respondents, including age, education, location,
income source, and wealth indicator. Key informants and
focus group participant revealed that households’ house or
dwelling characteristics, that is, type of walls, roof, floor, and
window, can reflect the wealth status of an individual or
household. Following this information, different parts of a
house or dwelling were assigned a score depending on the
type of material they are made from, with 1 being the lowest
score and 4 being the highest score. Hence household wealth
indicator was created based on aggregate scores assigned to
different household characteristics. Wealth indicator ranged
from 4 to 11, with a score of 4 representing the poorest and 11
being the richest household.
Household socioeconomic characteristics were tested as
predictors for (1) perceived overall programme impact and
access to programme benefits and (2) households’ responses
to the contingent valuation question, in order to deter-
mine benefit distribution across community members and
factors affecting access to benefits. Respondents were also
asked to indicate their perceived changes in the different
livelihood capitals before and after the programme was
initiated (Table 1) and the programme’s current overall impact
on their livelihoods (i.e., whether they were benefiting or
not). The response to perceived current overall impact on
their livelihoods was also tested as a determinant for the
households’ WTP.
3.2.3. ContingentValuation Survey. Weused annualmember-
ship fee as a payment vehicle to elicit household willingness
to pay values for forest comanagement programme. Many
individuals in the study area belong to small village groups
(e.g., village banking group, irrigation farming groups), to
which they are required to pay an annual membership fee,
to show commitment. Therefore, respondents are familiar
with the payment vehicle adopted, hence minimising the
occurrence of hypothetical bias. The hypothetical scenario
was presented as follows:
Imagine that the Government and its partners will
no longer be in a position to fund some of the
activities of the programme, thus they would like
to ask each community member to contribute in
the form of a membership fee, so as to ensure that
the activities of the programme continue in the
community.
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After presenting the payment vehicle, respondents were
allowed to ask questions to ensure that they had understood
the scenario, before presenting themwith theWTPquestions.
The questions asked by the majority of the respondents with
regard to the payment vehicle were (1) what will the money
be used for, and who will use it? and (2) will payment
translate to increased access to forest resources? This reflects
that respondents were able to understand the questions and
process the issues and constraints as they would in a real
situation before making a payment decision.
Following presentation of the hypothetical scenario,
respondents were asked whether or not they would be willing
to pay a membership fee. If the response was “no,” they were
asked to give reasons for their response, and the interviewwas
terminated. All such responses were considered as zeroWTP.
If the respondents answered “yes,” they were then asked how
much they would be willing to pay per year. An open-ended
question was used because (1) it would have been impossible
to have sufficient sample size within forest comanagement
implementing communities for a dichotomous question; (2)
during the preliminary survey we observed that respondents
did not have problems in stating the WTP amount since the
payment vehicle is common and familiar to most communi-
ties; and (3) being a heterogeneous community open-ended
questions provide more information on WTP that would
enable us to assess the credibility of the responses [34].
3.3. Data Analysis
3.3.1. Probit Model. A probit regression model was used to
explore factors that predict whether households (1) perceive
positive overall livelihoods impact of comanagement, (2)
accessed new income sources initiated by the programme,
and (3) were willing to pay membership fees to participate
in forest comanagement. According to Wooldridge [35] the
probit model equation is specified as
Pr (𝑌 = 1 | 𝑋) = Φ (𝑋𝛽) , 𝑌 = {1, 0} , (1)
where 𝑌 (dummy variable) is equal to 1 for households
giving a positive response and zero if otherwise. Φ is a
cumulative density function,𝑋 are household and individual
characteristics, and 𝛽 are parameters to be estimated.
3.3.2. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression and Tobit
Regression Model. Factors affecting open-ended WTP esti-
mates can be explored using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression. However, the use of OLS regression might lead
to biases in parameter estimates and misleading inferences
depending on the number of zeroWTP responses in the data
set [35, 36]. If zero responses are excluded, the use of OLS on
the censored data set may also result in sample selection bias,
as the remaining datawith positiveWTPonly is unlikely to be
a random sample, even if the initial sample (all included) was
random, and as such it may provide inconsistent parameter
estimates [35]. Therefore, in case of relatively large numbers
of zeroWTP, the censored regression model, known as Tobit,
is the theoretically preferred model [36]. A Tobit model with
selectivity allows decomposition of the data set to examine
more closely the effects of the independent variables on
positive WTP observations [36]. However, so far there is
no clear guide in the literature as to what number of zero
WTP observations require the use of Tobit regression in place
of OLS. Therefore both OLS regression (including the zero
WTP) and Tobit regression (censored at zero WTP) results
are presented in this paper.












where𝑌∗ is the amount that the household indicated that they
are willing to pay. OLS regression assumes that the dependent
variable 𝑌∗ is linear and continuous. 𝑋 are characteristics
of the household and the head of household and 𝛽 are
parameters to be estimated. The error term 𝜀 is assumed to
be normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎2. The
Tobit model follows the OLS regression equation; however,
the observed willingness to pay (𝑌∗) represents the latent

















if 𝑌∗ > 0,
0 if 𝑌∗ ≤ 0.
(3)
For both theOLS and Tobit regressionmodels, the dependent
variable is the annual amount households are willing to pay
as a membership fee, measured on a continuous scale. The
Variance Inflation factor (VIF) scores were less than 10 and
Tolerance scores ranged from 0.64 to 0.91, indicating weak
correlation between the explanatory variables [37]. For all the
regression models, bootstrapping (1000 resamples) was used
in estimating the coefficients, to correct for any distributional
and asymptotic errors and to ensure that the results are valid,
accurate, and closer to the population parameters [35]. Data
were analysed using STATA version 11.2.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Perceived Forest Comanagement Livelihoods Impacts.
Approximately 43% (Zomba-Malosa) and 28% (Ntchisi) of
the respondents perceive that the comanagement programme
has had or is having a positive impact on their livelihoods
and approximately 57% (Zomba-Malosa) and 71% (Ntchisi)
perceive that the programme has had no impact on their
livelihoods. This difference in number of households per-
ceiving a positive impact and those perceiving negative
impact could suggest inequalities or elite capture in benefit
sharing. This support the findings in [38] that found that
a majority of participants in comanagement programme, in
Malawi, perceive benefit distribution as unfair and that only
a few influential members of the community, for example,
committee members and chiefs, share the benefits.
A majority of respondents, 76% (Zomba-Malosa) and
73% (Ntchisi), perceive that the availability and accessibil-
ity of firewood and timber trees have reduced since the
programme started (Table 3). This could be attributed to
small levels of harvestable stock in the forest reserves due
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Table 3: Perceived livelihoods status before and after comanagement programme in Zomba-Malosa and Ntchisi.
Livelihoods
capitals Indicators
















Better availability of and
access to firewood and
NTFP
55 24 51 27
Better availability of and
access to timber and
pole trees
56 33 71 19
Financial
capital
Accessed loans 5 35 0 30 Village banks initiated
by the programmeSaving 7 39 3 24
Access to new income
sources N/A 31 N/A 32
(i) Wage labour N/A 43 N/A 17 During firebreak andforest road constructions
(ii) Forest based income





agriculture N/A 39 N/A 14
Perceived improvements














development 12 76 15 63
to the general declining trend in forest resources over the
years. Furthermore, tree populations take time to respond
to new management approaches [7]; hence the period of
comanagement implementation at the time of the study (7
years) would not have been long enough to allow forest
rehabilitation to a level yielding adequate harvestable stock.
Nevertheless, approximately 32% (Zomba-Malosa) and 24%
(Ntchisi) of respondents attributed the reduction in access
to forest resources to the strict laws and regulations being
enforced under the comanagement programme (under the
comanagement programme, the forest reserve is divided into
coupes to facilitate selective tree forest resources harvest-
ing; harvesting is done following the strict harvesting and
management plans, rules, and regulation; the strict laws and
regulations include selective harvesting of trees for timber,
only collecting dead wood for firewood, and harvesting of
both timber and nontimber forest products should only
be done upon acquisition of permit from the management
committee at a cost; furthermore, noncompliance with the
laws and regulation attracts sanctions and penalties, e.g.,
community work or fines [38]). Since noncompliance with
the laws and regulation attracts sanctions and penalties, for
example, community work or fine [38], thus to avoid penalty
communities comply. Furthermore, harvesting permits are
obtained upon paying a loyalty fee, which might be costly for
the rural poor with limited disposable income, thus reducing
their access to forest resource. Therefore, the perceived
reduction in access to and availability of forest resources is
a result of both comanagement (i.e., strict accessing rules and
regulations) and preexisting poor forest condition. The strict
enforcement of rules and regulations is necessary to allow for
the regeneration of the forest [26]; however there is a need
for balance so that the achievement of community livelihoods
goals is not constrained.
Approximately, 31% (Zomba-Malosa) and 32% (Ntchisi)
of respondents indicated that the programme has helped
them to attain new income sources, such as (a) wage labour
during firebreak construction and maintenance; (b) income
generating activities, for example, timber sales, firewood
sales, pottery (clay pots) sales, bee-keeping, and mushroom
farming; and (c) indirect benefits in the form of dry season
irrigated agriculture (Table 3). Similarly, therewas an increase
in the number of households accessing loans and saving
in the local village banks since the programme started.
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The estimated amount in annual savings ranged from MK
500 (US$ 1.7) (the exchange rate at the time of study was
Malawi Kwacha (MK) 288.7347 = US$ 1) to MK 10000
(US$ 34.4) in Zomba-Malosa and MK 500 (US$ 1.7) to MK
6000 (US$ 20.8) in Ntchisi district. The loans are linked
to the programme’s enhancement of social capital within
the participating communities, as the loans are accessed
from a local community bank initiated by the programme.
Additionally, 31% (Zomba-Malosa) and 32% (Ntchisi) of
the respondents have accessed new income sources (e.g.,
wage labour and forest-based business groups initiated by
the programme). Thus approximately 36% (Zomba-Malosa)
and 29% (Ntchisi) of the respondents indicated that they
have managed to acquire assets (e.g., household utensils,
furniture, bicycles, and farm equipment) as a result of their
participation in income generating activities initiated by the
programme. However, the income generating activities that
are being promoted in the area (e.g., firewood sale and
pottery) are of low value [21], hence the minimal impact
on household income levels. Also, it is important to note
that the income generating activities are externally subsidised
by the programme donors (e.g., initial transport to market),
hence the current far-from-universal positive impact on
livelihoods creates uncertainties for the programme’s long
term livelihoods impacts when the donor or external funding
is withdrawn.
We observed that the programme’s investment in physical
capital at community level is limited. Both communities
highlighted accessible forest roads as a major infrastructure
development that they require. The communities were of the
view that even if the forest reserves were to have significant
high value timber trees, with potential to generate high
revenue, the current poor roads would limit access to eco-
nomically viable markets. This would limit the programme’s
potential to positively improve livelihoods, both during and
even beyond its implementation period.
Amajority of communitymembers perceive that training
and skill development activities have increased since the pro-
gramme started (Table 3). Although the programme does not
provide formal education, it contributes to the development
of human capital, by facilitating training in forest and tree
management techniques. The programme also facilitates and
enhances the development of social capital through establish-
ment of village committees and initiating regular community
meetings, where issues relating to forest management and
other developmental issues are discussed. The committee
meetings allow for regular interactionwith government forest
staff and other stakeholders, hence increasing their social
network base and ability to contribute to forest policies
that affect their livelihoods [27]. Furthermore, social capital
enhances human and financial capital among households
since communities are able to form village banking groups
and further access loans from the banks [38].
4.2. Who Has Benefited? The probability of perceiving a
positive overall impact of comanagement on livelihoods is
89% higher for households in Zomba-Malosa compared to
those in Ntchisi (Table 4, A) and 49% higher for households
that perceive better access to and availability of firewood.
Firewood and NTFPs are essential for day-to-day livelihood
strategies for rural households inMalawi; therefore improved
access to and availability of forest resources directly and
positively affect households’ livelihoods.
The results show that households that perceive increased
participation in communal activities because of the pro-
gramme are 34% more likely to perceive the overall pro-
gramme impact as beneficial than those who did not (Table 4,
A), therefore suggesting that communities not only measure
perceived benefits in terms of economic benefits but also
measure perceived benefits in social and noncash benefits,
contrary to Phiri et al. [23] who suggested that communities
perceive the benefits of forest comanagement programmes as
minimal because they only measure benefit in terms of mon-
etary or tangible economic benefit. Access to new income
sources increases a household’s probability of describing the
overall programme impact as positive by approximately 92%
(Table 4, A). This is expected because access to new income
sources can potentially translate into increased income levels
and improved livelihoods [3, 8]. Furthermore, new income
sources may diversify household livelihood sources hence
reducing household’s vulnerability to shocks and stresses
(e.g., failure in crop production) [24].
The income generating activities initiated by the pro-
gramme are forest-based and group-based; hence it is plau-
sible that the probability of accessing new income sources
is higher for households that perceived better access to and
availability of forest resources (30%) and better participation
in communal activities (40%) (Table 4, B). Households whose
head is a committee member is approximately 60% more
likely to access new income sources and to perceive the
overall impact as beneficial (Table 4, B). Although this
raises questions about the equity of benefits sharing among
community members, there is no further evidence from the
probit model to suggest that access to new income sources is
influenced by household characteristics or social status (e.g.,
wealth status, gender, and age). Lastly, access to new income
sources is positively and significantly related to access to
loans.This is expected as usually households opt for loans for
investment purposes, for example, small businesses, rather
than consumption [39].
4.3. WTP to Participate in the Forest
Comanagement Programme
4.3.1. Are Households Willing to Pay a Membership Fee? Al-
though a majority perceive that currently they are not
benefiting from the programme, approximately 83% (Zomba-
Malosa) and 81% (Ntchisi) of respondents are willing to pay
membership fees to participate in the forest comanagement
programme. The mean annual willingness to pay amount is
approximately MK 1,000 (US$ 3.5) in Zomba-Malosa and
MK 400 (US$ 1.4) in Ntchisi, respectively. These values are
approximately five times (Zomba-Malosa) and two times
(Ntchisi) the minimum daily wage rate (daily wage rate
in urban communities is estimated at MK 200; however
the Malawi Government Employment Act stipulates MK 98
8 International Journal of Forestry Research




Accessing new income sources
B
Coefficients BootstrappedStd. errors Coefficients
Bootstrapped
Std. errors
District (Ntchisi = 1; Zomba = 0) −0.89∗∗∗∗ (0.25) −0.24 (0.24)
Better access to and availability of timber (1
= yes; 0 = no) 0.06 (0.13) 0.32
∗∗ (0.13)
Better access to and availability of firewood
(1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.49
∗∗∗∗ (0.14) −0.18 (0.13)
Better training and skill development (1 =
yes; 0 = no) 0.07 (0.15) −0.21 (0.14)
Better participation in communal activity (1
= yes; 0 = no) 0.34
∗∗ (0.16) 0.40∗∗ (0.18)
Committee member (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.40∗ (0.23) 0.687∗∗∗ (0.21)
Acquired assets (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.50∗ (0.26)
Accessed new income sources (1 = yes; 0 =
no) 0.92
∗∗∗∗ (0.23)
Accessed loans (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.69 (0.81) 0.78∗ (0.56)
Saving (1 = yes; 0 = no) −0.14 (0.22) 0.19 (0.21)
Married (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.09 (0.12) −0.23 (0.13)
Gender of household head (1 = female, 0 =
male) −0.07 (0.23) −0.33 (0.21)
Age of household head (in years) −0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Household size (number of adults and
children) 0.03 (0.05) −0.10 (0.05)
Land size (in hectares) 0.09 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Wealth indicator (ordinal scale, 4–11) 0.03 (0.06) −0.03 (0.06)
cons 0.04 (0.78) −0.37 (0.71)
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.01
Number 213 213
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.24 0.14
Log pseudo likelihood −101.11 −110.57
Significance levels (∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%; and ∗∗∗∗: 0.01%).
as the daily wage rate in rural areas [40]) and represent
approximately 6% (Zomba-Malosa) and 4% (Ntchisi) of
the average estimated annual earning of the respondents
(the estimated annual earning for respondents is MK 15000
in Zomba-Malosa and MK 9000 in Ntchisi). Considering
that rural Malawi is characterised by high poverty levels,
high unemployment rates, heavy reliance on smallholder
agriculture, susceptibility to shocks, and limited disposable
income such that 20% of the rural population struggle to
even afford the daily recommended food requirements [41]
(approximately 75% of Malawians live under the poverty
threshold of under US$ 1.25 a day; 28% of the rural house-
holds (which is 85% of total population) are characterised
as ultrapoor, with limited access to employment as 75% earn
their living only from smallholder farming, and for those on
wage employment the income is so minimal; hence the dis-
posable income is very low; additionally people have limited
or even no access to financial services such as credits, which
further limits their economic growth and spending pattern
[41]), the willingness to pay values represent a substantial
proportion of households’ annual income. This suggests that
communities are optimistic about substantial future liveli-
hoods and welfare benefits from the programme and thus
willing to invest in the programme’s activities. However, it
is doubtful that communities will accrue positive livelihoods
andwelfare benefits from the programme in future (especially
after withdrawal of external support), when it is failing to
provide the majority with positive benefits at present, despite
the externally subsidised income generating activities it is
currently implementing. Therefore, it can be argued that the
estimated willingness to pay is due to respondents’ optimism
(optimism bias) of future benefits that forest recovery could
potentially provide. Interestingly, a majority of those not
willing to pay in both Zomba-Malosa (87%) and Ntchisi
(72%) attributed their decision to lack of benefits from the
programme and lack of trust in the leadership with regard to
financial accountability and inability to pay. Chinangwa [38]
also observed a general lack of trust in leadership with regard
to financial accountability among communities participating
in forest comanagement programme in Zomba-Malosa and
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Table 5: Factors affecting households’ willingness to pay a member-
ship fee to participate in comanagement programme in Zomba and
Ntchisi districts.
Probit model (WTP = 1)
Coefficients BootstrappedStd. errors
Perceived overall impact dummy
(1 = benefiting, 0 = not benefiting) 0.43
∗ (0.23)
Wealth indicator (ordinal scale,
4–11) 0.11
∗ (0.08)
Number of years in school 0.07∗∗ (0.03)
Committee member (1 = yes, 0 =
no) 0.36
∗ (0.25)
Land size (in hectares) 0.03 (0.03)
District (1 = Ntchisi, 0 = Zomba) 0.17 (0.22)
Gender of household head (1 =
female, 0 = male) −0.20 (0.22)
Married (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.07 (0.12)
Household size (number of adults
and children) 0.03 (0.05)
Age of household head (in years) −0.00 (0.01)
cons −0.82 (0.79)
Prob > chi2 0.02
Number of observations 213
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.10
Log pseudo likelihood −95.13
Significance levels (∗: 10% and ∗∗: 5%).
Ntchisi, thus negatively affecting how they perceive and
access benefit of the programme and consequently how
they value the programme’s welfare benefits relative to state
management regime.
4.3.2. Factors Affecting Household Decision to Pay Member-
ship Fee. The probit regression shows that households that
perceive comanagement to have a positive impact on their
livelihoods are 43% more likely to be willing to pay than
those that perceive otherwise (Table 5), so as to secure
continued livelihoods and benefit flows [9, 13]. An increase in
households’ wealth indicator by 1 point increases household
probability for willingness to pay by 10% (Table 5). This
suggests that wealthier households are more appreciative
of forest comanagement and conservation, as they are less
dependent on the forest for their livelihoods, than poor
households. Furthermore, this shows that they are more
able to invest in comanagement activities for the expected
potential future benefits.
An extra year of schooling increases household proba-
bility of being willing to pay by 7% (Table 5). Mekonnen
[9] suggests that more years in formal education enhance
peoples’ ability to understand and respond to the willingness
to pay hypothetical questions. Therefore, the positive effect
of schooling on willingness to pay may not necessarily indi-
cate that educated people value the programme more than
uneducated households but indicate that they understood the
hypothetical question better. Committee members are more
likely to be willing to pay to participate in comanagement
(Table 5) because they are trained in forest management
and in constant contact with forest staff and hence have a
broader knowledge of the overall benefits of the programme
and as such they are more appreciative of the programme.
However, the committeemember’s likelihood of beingwilling
to pay could be attributed to the greater benefits they access
through programmes (e.g., Table 4, B). Furthermore, com-
mittee members’ willingness to pay may be affected by social
desirability bias, as they may view being willing to pay as an
acceptable answer, since they are programme coordinators at
community level.
4.3.3. Factors Affecting How Much Households Are Willing to
Pay in Membership Fees. Although Halstead et al. [36] argue
that the sign of coefficients estimated using Tobit analysis
may differ from those estimated using OLS, we found no
such differences, probably due to the small proportion of
zero WTP (approximately 20%, [42]). Our results show no
significant difference between the OLS and Tobit models
except for the size of coefficients (Table 6).
Both the OLS and Tobit regressions suggest that respon-
dents’ district, wealth indicator score, gender of household
head, and land size significantly affect households’ decision
on howmuch they are willing to pay (Table 6). Households in
Zomba-Malosa (meanWTP =MK989 per year) are willing to
pay more than households in Ntchisi (mean WTP = MK 400
per year). This may be attributed to socioeconomic variation
across communities and how dependent the communities
are on the forest for their livelihoods. For example, whilst
an estimated 80% of the Ntchisi district economy and
livelihoods are said to be agriculture based, it is estimated that
90% of Zomba-Malosa population are dependent on forests
resources [35, 43]. Therefore it is plausible that communities
in Zomba-Malosa are likely to be willing to pay more so as to
secure their livelihoods and welfare flow.
An increase in households’ wealth indicator by 1 point
increases the WTP value by approximately MK 298 (OLS) or
MK 412 (Tobit model). Households’ WTP is associated with
ability to pay [44]. As households’ wealth status improves
with increased income levels and asset base, they are likely
to have disposable income and as such capable and likely
to be willing to pay more for forest activities compared to
poorer households [45]. Similar trends have been observed
by Chikwuone and Okorji [44], for forest management in
Nigeria.
Female-headed households are willing to pay approxi-
mately MK 298 (OLS) or MK 610 (Tobit model) less than
male-headed households. Due to cultural norms, female-
headed households in rural Malawi have limited access
to forest management programme’s financial benefits and
resources [46]; thus the limited welfare benefits from the
programme could be reducing their willingness to pay and
value of the programme. This is in contrast to findings by
Chikwuone and Okorji [44], who show that female-headed
households are likely to bewilling to paymore for community
forestry compared to male-headed ones, because women
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Table 6: Factors affecting howmuch households’ willingness to pay amembership fee to participate in comanagement programme in Zomba
and Ntchisi districts (in Malawi Kwacha).
OLS model Tobit model
Coefficients BootstrappedStd. errors Coefficients
Bootstrapped
Std. errors
District (1 = Ntchisi, 0 = Zomba) −697.60∗∗ (304.77) −646.07∗∗ (347.16)
Household size (number of adults and
children) −11.56 (44.93) −26.00 (56.93)
Wealth indicator (ordinal scale, 4–11) 298.69∗∗ (132.17) 412.54∗∗ (191.84)
Gender of household head (1 = female, 0 =
male) −520.47
∗∗ (322.91) −610.48∗∗ (−587.61)
Number of years in school −15.41 (73.70) −32.15 (79.03)
Married (1 = yes, 0 = no) 146.18 (128.76) 210.23 (152.19)
Age of household head (in years) −4.66 (17.73) −11.26 (21.29)
Committee member (1 = yes, 0 = no) −366.79 (269.37) −280.87 (318.15)
Land size (in hectares) 60.59∗ (35.10) 89.54∗ (48.23)
Perceived overall impact dummy (1 =
benefiting, 0 = not benefiting) 172.68 (338.46) 333.89 (421.54)
cons −15.13 (690.11) −1479.25 (1293.83)
sigma cons 2736.98∗∗∗∗ (831.17)






Significance levels (∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; and ∗∗∗∗: 0.01%).
depend on forest resources for their livelihoods more than
men. However it is plausible to argue that female-headed
households have limited access to benefits and lower income
levels and are more prone to risks and uncertainties in terms
of income sources compared to male-headed households
[47], hence likely to be willing to pay less than male-headed
household.
The amount households are willing to pay is significantly
and positively related to land size (Table 6). This could
be because households with small land holdings may be
encroaching into the forest to increase their landholdings and
hence may not be engaged or interested in the conservation
activities under comanagement, as they may be viewed as
conflicting with their individual goals. Similar findings were
found byChinangwa [38]who observed that householdswith
bigger land sizes are more likely to perceive forest conserva-
tion as criteria formeasuring success of forest comanagement
programme, compared to those with small land holdings in
Malawi.
5. Conclusion
The findings of this study suggest that forest comanagement
programmes can potentially improve household livelihoods
by introducing profitable income generating activities; facil-
itating local lending and savings; enhancing social capital;
and development of human capital through training. The
positive effect on a household’s likelihood of accessing new
income sources from the programme when the household
head is a committee member, coupled with the positive
effects on household'sWTP by households land holding sizes
and wealth status, suggests that access to and distribution
of programme benefits may be affected by households’
socioeconomic status. Livelihoods diversification away from
traditional agriculture through access to new forest-based
and non-forest-based income sources could reduce house-
hold’s vulnerability to stresses and hence eventually result in
protection of the forest resources through reduced pressure
and increased management and conservation activities by
the participating communities. However, these efforts should
be complemented with investment in physical capital and
financial incentives, at community level, to enable com-
munity members to access economically viable markets
and ensure that the programme’s impacts are sustainable
beyond the programme.The impacts of forest comanagement
programmes often take a long time to materialise because
there is a need to reestablish the condition of the forests
to yield harvestable stock, as well as the need to develop
effective management practices that are appropriate to the
needs of the community. Therefore, although the current
livelihoods impacts of the programme are minimal, this does
not imply that the comanagement programme is a failure.
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There is a potential for better or higher livelihood benefits
from the programme in future, if proper management and
utilization strategies are followed. The management and
utilization strategies could include adherence to the selective
tree harvesting and implementing afforestation programme
and development of explicit user rights and benefit sharing
procedure. Furthermore, to enhance accountability in man-
agement and utilization, public hearing and audit session
should be introduced.
Although the livelihood impacts of comanagement are
currently minimal and restricted to a subset of the commu-
nity, community members may be willing to pay a member-
ship fee to participate in a forest comanagement programme
because of their perceived future benefits of the programme.
This also demonstrates the danger of relying on stated pref-
erence surveys alone to estimate welfare effects, because the
WTP values given by respondents could represent a number
of things and may not always reflect respondents’ present
gains from the policy change or programme. Furthermore,
this shows that community’s investments of time and labour
in the forest comanagement programme could be based on an
overly optimistic view that in future the net welfare benefits
from the programme will increase, which puts them at a
risk of being taken advantage of by programme initiators
in setting up CFM projects. Therefore, although contin-
gent valuation methods remain important in estimating the
economic value of environmental management policies like
comanagement, the sustainable livelihoods framework seems
more reliable at representing the real current impacts or
benefits of comanagement on community livelihoods. Given
the paucity of empirical evidence on comanagement, this
paper makes useful empirical and methodological contri-
butions towards the evidence base of forest comanagement
livelihoods impacts that are likely to be applicable to other
comanagement projects and studies as well as to other forms
of CBFM initiatives at regional as well as global level.
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